Affective states, adaptive scenarios, and how biology and culture are framed in anthropological debate

[Intellectual type stuff ahead.]

Facebook surprises me sometimes when halfway (or more) intelligent or respectful threads emerge on complex or contentious topics. But it does happen! So I got involved just a bit. The issue was whether a particular affective state (in this case a particular emotional response) was adaptive and whether one could test a hypothesis for its evolutionary origins. Part of it was also whether every aspect of human life should have some kind specific evolutionary explanation.

My comments are stitched together here:

Speculative philosophy informed by science is useful and inevitable, as are generalized summaries of experimental results integrated into a broadly accepted metaphysics. But they can be misrepresented and over-used. The grey area between these things and the actual scientific processes of observation, correlation, and explanation, and experimentation seems inevitable as well. And on a related note, the price you pay for trying to have a theory that consumes everything is the risk of intellectual indigestion.

As to the specific type of study that might test the idea of loneliness as adaptation, I am sure one could extrapolate out from a proxy representing key variables or processes, but it would need to be really clever. If you could assign a marker for loneliness to non-human primate behavior in an appropriate taxon, you might have the start of something. But that is one really huge "if". Does anyone know if this adaptive loneliness idea has literature attached to it beyond "it appears it may be beneficial so it is probably an adaptation"? How do the authors frame their argument?

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This is the kind of issue that highlights how metaphysical differences in explanatory models and the resulting language communities create difficulties in describing and discussing what is inside or outside the domain or scope of a particular approach or methodology. Because this thread isn't just about the issue of whether we can or should treat loneliness as an adaptation.

What, for example, is included within "biology" and is therefore by extension open to the scrutiny of evolutionary investigation? (Even if a biological trait may be useful in some situations, does that mean it must be explained by selection in adaptive scenarios? I seem to recall reading about this years ago in "Adaptation and Natural Selection") Broadly speaking, biology is understood as the examination of the origin, composition, and function of the anatomy and physiology of organisms and and how they play out in the life cycle of said organisms.

However, humans are extremely social and possess the capacity to perceive, reflect, and communicate about things that do not accurately reflect the direct perception of immediately present material objects and physical effects. This capacity for openness, innovation, and prevarication in thought and language allows humans to process their inner and inter-subjective understanding of reality in both linear/logical and non-linear/irrational ways, the combination of which allows for creativity not only in our thoughts but in our sense of existence. The capacity for absurdity and strangeness (by conventional standards), the ability to challenge the limits of what is permissible or possible, has allowed our species to create and solve problems other species cannot (as far as we can tell) fathom.

The net result is that human evolution has granted us the ability and impulse to live in symbolically encoded and socially constructed worldviews that are layered onto and go beyond the material or sensory-based perception of reality. This layered duality does not mean humans don't retain any instinctual tendencies from their ancestry that impact social behavior or organization, but it does mean that such an instinctual repertoire responds to perceptions of reality that go beyond the mundane material view. This is at the heart of the human version of the nature-nuture debate, wherein cultural, social, and biological determinism mix and conflict and are challenged by assertions of agency.

So, it may in fact be true that being ostracized has consequences that make sense from a selection-based scenario, and thus it may also make sense that the feeling of loneliness is related to feeling socially isolated (which is different than choosing to be alone). Yet even if loneliness as an emotional response and sensation evolved as an adaptive response to social marginalization, it's depth and impact are going to be altered, along with the number and type of potential triggers and expressions, in a species of extremely social beings that occupy a shared social reality that can widely diverge from community to community.

(And can we say individual emotions evolved or could a capacity for social logic tied to the limbic system produce a range of responses, some of which may at times even interfere with social acceptance and participation? How does that change the evolutionary scenarios?)

This is also how I see the meaning of Wendy's statement about not being defined by her biology. I take it to mean she is not solely defined by her biology, particular her basic anatomy and physiology, but rather by the social mind, sense of self, capacity for agency, and participation in a socially shaped sense of reality that her biology enables and supports. For what its' worth I see this shared psycho-social reality as akin to what more hierarchical or holistic approaches would call an emergent phenomenon, another level of organization echoing some broad organic principles found various levels in the organization of life, with the human mind as an interface between the biochemical and social landscapes.

This re-frames some questions about adaptive affective states and other psychological phenomenon by directing the question to which level of organization and integration (intra-cellular, inter-cellular, psycho-social, cultural) a character trait emerges from, what kind of properties, influences on development, and forms of expression are involved at that level, and how it affects other levels of organization. And also what happens if a new level of sophistication and integration emerges that regulates information in distinct ways with unique properties? (Such as human psycho-social systems?) How does such a development impact previously acquired traits? If the sense of loneliness emerged as a social trait in an ancestor for particular reasons, what can (and can't) that tell us about how it is experienced and expressed in different human populations or individuals today? Is the broad explanation of a general function itself still relevant? To what degree? (I don't ask these things dismissively just following the line of thought.)

This gets back to whether "biology", referring in this case primarily to the observable biochemical foundations of anatomy and physiology and its functioning/relationship to the life course of particular organisms, is adequate to describe and explain the human condition, and hence whether evolutionary biology, especially when focused at that level, is always useful or necessary when attempting to understand what it is to live and experience life as a human being. And this is while setting aside the issue of whether ontological naturalism or the more generic materialism should be define the limits of existence and experience.

If, in fact, one wishes biology to encompass the human social reality, ironically then this needs to be recognized as its own level of "organic" organization. Like all previous expansions in biological organization, if the (human) social landscape represents another major expansion of complexity, it will share some broad organic trends in with prior expansions on but will need to be studied in its own right. This is the hot spot. Because if we just reduce the complexity to broad generalities it is easier to be systematic and to make comparisons between cultural communities or even species.

This at times is very beneficial and necessary, ignoring some details and complexities to better appreciate larger patterns. Yet in doing so with human socio-cultural systems we risk losing sight of the particular innovation taking place at the new level of complex organization and where such may be headed (as well as the real, meaningful differences in particular cultural communities of concerning the lived experience of being human). And here we approach, via an overly long and circuitous route, the crux of well-worn debates between some ev psych proponents and some cultural anthros in the systemic versus humanist long war. Big picture generalized views and small picture particular views are both recognized as important and relevant, but whose theoretical paradigm and supporting methodologies should apply to either?

Yes this was (way, way too) long, but I think we often take for granted that when we use terms like "biology" and "culture" that others assign the same limits, emphasis, and significance to them. There are certainly real and important differences between schools of thought in anthropology, which create valuable debate. I don't wish to deny or dispense with those differences. But not everyone who discusses human nature, human evolution, biology, the mind, culture, and so on does so with the same ontological and epistemological assumptions, even with physical anthropology, and this can lead to arguments based more on communication failure than actual, significant, and important differences on substantive issues. Not that you didn't already know that, but I thought I'd reveal some of the potential subtext for such discussions and debates using my own perspective as example.

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That is what I was asking, to wit, to what degree and in what way is an explanation of the origin of an affective state, either by testable hypothesis or by speculation informed by a particular theoretical paradigm, relevant when the species in question possessing such a trait becomes part of a larger level of organic integration. Especially when the brain becomes embedded in an integrated psycho-social landscape which can be untethered from immediate physical sense impressions and where perception must include this other layer of symbolic reality.

I don't know what they answer is, but again, I think it points to the classic issue of the spectra running from agency to determinism and from the cultural to biological. What reactions are directly tied into a presumedly evolved social-affective system and how is the development, activation, and experience of that system different for an organism living in an augmented social reality? How is its use comparable to or distinct from similar species not living with such a highly symbolic and subjective perception of their existence?

Which is to say, we seem to be right back at the same kind of divides over whether "biology" (emphasizing anatomy and physiology as the direct basis of all organismal traits) or "social factors/culture" (emphasizing the creative capacity of the human mind and the collective inter-subjective perceptions of a symbolically encoded and charged worldview) should take precedence for explaining the human experience. Even if we say the social landscape and its psycho-social foundation is an emergent quality arising from a biological foundation, that doesn't substantively alter that dividing line, because it still treats the "culture" side as a level of organization requiring its own sets of explanations above and beyond the levels underpinning it.

I take it this is where your concern of the value of generalized, speculative explanations versus particular, concrete examples of the phenomenon in question comes in. And I have to say, these kinds of discussions and debates are one of the reasons I love anthropology.

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On the evolutionary explanation side, the tendency to name something, give it properties, decide it has utility, and presume there must be a specific selection-based adaptive scenario for that trait is characteristic of some manifestations of a particular evolutionary paradigm which one is free to embrace or reject for any given subject of study.

Then there is issue of the mindset of explanation, which is another interesting quirk of the manifestation of the human social mind. There is more to life than just explaining the things we encounter and the mental boxes we put them in as we name and describe them. The experience of things, of life itself, is also important. To the degree science can enhance such experiences, it is a worthwhile endeavor. But science and its theories cannot replace such experiences.   

Be well.